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The dissolution of an elderly person’s independent household-either  to live 
in another household or to become institutionalized-is  an incisive life event 
that  has many  implications  for the  well-being  of  the  elderly  person.  Most 
elderly hold  most or all of  their wealth in housing  (Memll 1984). In most 
cases, the dissolution of an elderly person’s independent household implies the 
sale of  the house and therefore a substantial change in the elderly’s wealth 
position. In case of institutionalization, some of this wealth may be used to pay 
for front-loaded fees; in the case of moving to own children, the wealth may 
be transferred to the next generation by  transferring headship of the family 
home. 
The choice of living arrangements by the elderly is also an important aspect 
of the economics of aging at large because of the side effects in the provision 
of  care  and  the  physical  environment  that  this  choice  implies.  Sharing 
accommodations,  in  particular  with  adult  children,  will  provide  not  only 
housing  for the  elderly  but  also  some  degree of  medical  care and  social 
support. If the elderly perceive sharing accommodations as an inferior housing 
alternative  and  remain  living  independently  as  long  as  their  physical  and 
economic means allow, this social support and a larger amount of medical care 
have to be picked up by  society at large rather than by  the family or close 
friends. Moving to adult children is also an important  substitute for institu- 
tionalization.  As  the  private  and  social  costs  of  institutionalization  are 
skyrocketing, the family may have to become yet again a resort for the elderly. 
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This is not only a question of distribution-whether  the family or society at 
large pays an otherwise equal bill. One may  also argue that independently 
living elderly are more isolated and incur higher costs for medical care and 
social support, for example, because of the psychosomatic effects of isolation 
or a lower interest in preventive care by elderly living alone. 
Household dissolution decisions also have important consequences for the 
intergenerational distribution of housing. In particular in times of tight housing 
market conditions with very high housing prices for newly developed units, the 
elderly’s willingness to move out of the family home is an important parameter 
in the supply of more affordable existing homes. If elderly households stay in 
their  family homes  well  into their  8Os,  the next  generation  will  have  little 
chance  to  move  into  the  family  homes  while  their  children  (the  third 
generation)  are being  raised  and  demand  for space  is largest.  If  houses  of 
younger families with children are relatively more spacious than those of the 
elderly,  the elderly  may  be perceived  as being  “overhoused”-implying  a 
sense of  intergenerational  inequity. 
Household  dissolution  may  change  eligibility  for  certain  government 
programs (Schwartz, Danziger, and Smolensky 1984). Eligibility and transfer 
level  for  the  food  stamp  and  supplemental  social  security  programs  is 
determined by the income of the household, not by the income of the elderly. 
Elderly  who received  supplemental  security  income may  lose  this  income 
once they move to children with own income. This may induce elderly to stay 
living as an independent household longer than they may want to in the absence 
of  these transfer programs. 
Finally,  Schwartz, Danziger and  Smolensky  (1984) point  out  a perverse 
effect in measured income inequality: if the proportion of independently living 
elderly  increases,  then, ceteris paribus, income inequality  will rise because 
there are more small households with low income than if they had lived in a 
joint household with a combined larger income. The income distribution effect 
is perverse when it was a slight increase in the elderly’s income that produced 
the increased proportion of  elderly living independently. Of course, the effect 
is purely statistical and vanishes when income inequality is measured, not on 
the level of  households, but on a lower level, for example, on the level of 
family nuclei (Borsch-Supan  1989). 
This paper  studies  the  demographic and  economic determinants  of  the 
elderly’s decision to stay living independently or to dissolve the independent 
household in order to choose some kind of shared accommodations or to move 
in an institution such as a nursing  home or a home for the aged. The main 
questions being asked are as follows. 
What are typical sequences of living arrangements in old age? How often do 
elderly move between their home, their children, and an institution? 
Which events precipitate changes in living arrangements? What are typical 
living arrangement sequences after retirement, after death of a spouse, after 
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Are there cohort or calendar-time effects in the preferences for certain living 
arrangements  that can be distinguished from pure age effects? Are the elderly 
becoming more isolated in the last years? 
How many elderly remain living independently until they die’?  Who are the 
elderly living independently? Are they younger, are they wealthier, are they 
isolated? 
Are economic conditions (income, housing prices) important determinants 
for the choice among living independently,  sharing accommodations, and 
living  in  an  institution?  Or is  the  decision  to  give  up  an  independent 
household simply determined by  age and health? 
This paper is one of a triad of papers on household dissolution and choice 
of living arrangements of elderly Americans in this volume. It poses some of 
the  same questions (and  arrives  at  very  similar  answers) as  the  paper  by 
Ellwood and Kane, using the same data but a very different methodology. The 
coincidence of all major results yields some confidence in the robustness of my 
results, in spite of many data problems. Whereas this and Ellwood and Kane’s 
paper  concentrate  on  the  demand  for  dependent  and  independent  living 
arrangements,  the  triad’s  third  paper,  by  Kotlikoff  and  Morris,  is  more 
interested in the supply side and closes a model of living arrangement choices 
by providing a structural model of  dependent living arrangements. 
Economic incentives for household formation and, by implication, house- 
hold dissolution have been extensively studied for the general population in the 
seventies. A survey of  this literature can be found in Borsch-Supan  (1985). 
With a focus on the elderly, this research has been picked up recently by two 
papers that employ different data sets in order to study determinants of living 
arrangements for the aged. Schwartz, Danziger and Smolensky (1984) employ 
the  Retirement  History  Survey  (RHS) to  estimate  a  binary  choice  model 
between living independently and dependently-that  is, in another household, 
most commonly that of their children. In spite of the size of this data set, their 
empirical  results  were  mixed,  and  neither  health  nor  income effects could 
convincingly be proven, mostly owing to their econometric methodology and 
the poor health measures available in the RHS. Borsch-Supan (1989) estimated 
a multinomial  logit model of  living arrangements on data from the Annual 
Housing Survey (AHS) that distinguishes  several dependent living arrange- 
ments  rather  than  just  one  category.  Both  papers  share  two  important 
shortcomings: their data sets prohibited  an analysis  that  takes  institutional- 
ization into account, and neither paper performed  a dynamic analysis.  This 
paper attempts to overcome these two shortcomings. 
The probability of institutionalization per se is the focus of many studies that 
are reviewed by Garber and MaCurdy’s  paper in this volume. In contrast to 
these  papers,  this  paper  concentrates on  permanent  institutionalization  as 
opposed to the more frequent short-term stays in nursing homes. Garber and 
MaCurdy provide some link between short- and long-term institutionalization 
by endogenizing duration of  stay. 92  Axel Borsch-Supan 
The paper is organized as follows. Since answers to the first three groups 
of questions enumerated above require panel  data, and since answers to all 
questions demand data with a lot of detail about elderly persons and their living 
arrangements, I will first describe the data, their novelty, and their problems 
and present the construction of  the essential variables.  Section  3.2 provides 
estimates  of  transition  probabilities  for all  elderly  in  my sample. Sections 
3.3-3.6 are then devoted to three subsamples, each relating to a particular life 
event. I  first analyze transitions  in response  to the death of  a spouse, then 
investigate transitions after the onset of a disability in section 3.4, and finally 
focus on the last five years of  life of  those elderly  who decease during the 
sample period. Sections 3.2-3.6 are organized as variations on a theme and 
have a common pattern.  First, I will categorize observed sequences of  living 
arrangements  and  describe  their  frequencies.  Second,  multinomial  logit 
models are employed in order to estimate the weights of potential causes for 
these sequences or choices of  living arrangements. The final section summa- 
rizes  the  results  and  critically  discusses the paper’s  assumptions and  data 
sources. 
3.1  Data and Variable Definitions 
An empirical  investigation  of  living  arrangement  transitions  faces many 
technical problems. First, the detection of transitions and an analysis of living 
arrangement sequences require a longitudinal data set that covers a long time 
span. There are, however,  very  few  long  panels  in  the United  States, the 
longest being the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Second, elderly 
are particularly  prone to become “nonresponses”  in a survey for systematic 
reasons:  although  their  geographic  mobility  is  low,  which  alleviates  the 
problem of locating elderly respondents, they may become institutionalized or 
die. In most surveys, these persons are then lost in the sample. Third, a study 
of  living  arrangements needs  information  not  only  about  the  immediate 
household but also about the family of the elderly person, which may provide 
alternative living arrangements. Similarly, for such a study one needs to know 
a combination of economic, demographic, and health variables that is unusual 
for most general purpose surveys. Finally, the very old may have difficulties 
in answering questions precisely, particularly about their health status, and the 
interviewer therefore has to phrase questions more carefully and double-check 
answers. Currently, there is no data set fulfilling all these requirements. 
My analysis is based on the new complete family-individual based file of the 
PSID, 1968-84.  This file includes all persons who have ever been interviewed 
as a member of a PSID family. In contrast  to earlier PSID releases,  it also 
includes  people  who  are classified  as  nonrespondents  in  the  last  available 
interview year (1  984), for example, persons who have died in the course of the 
panel  study.  The data  therefore  provide  a  new  opportunity to look at  the 
economic and housing conditions of the very old, particularly those who have 
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The main advantage of the PSID is its long time horizon of up to seventeen 
years. This enables us to create event histories, to detect typical sequences of 
living arrangements, and to estimate transition probabilities that depend on age 
as well as on calendar time. Another important advantage of the PSID for the 
study of living arrangement decisions is the collection of at least some data at 
the individual level (rather than the household  level) in the so-called family- 
individual file and the careful recording of household composition as it relates 
to the head of household. This makes it possible to detect elderly  living as 
subfamilies or as  ‘‘secondary  individuals”  in  households  headed  by  their 
children  or other persons.  Finally,  the  nonresponse  file  keeps records  for 
persons  even when they become institutionalized.  This is in contrast  to all 
major cross-sectional data sources that comprise either the institutionalized or 
the noninstitutionalized  population  and also in contrast to most longitudinal 
data sources that have only one nonresponse category and do not distinguish 
between institutionalization,  death, and other reasons for nonresponse. ’ 
In addition to its extreme ~nwieldiness,~  the PSID also has several severe 
shortcomings that limit the kind of analysis that would be appropriate for the 
study of the elderly’s living arrangements. Most important, the PSID does not 
contain a systematic record of the functional health status of  the elderly. I will 
depend  on age  and an indicator  for disability  status  as  variables  proxying 
health. The PSID does not record structural housing characteristics that could 
allow for a precise definition of  housing prices corrected for quality differ- 
ences. Unit housing prices must be assigned from external sources such as the 
AHS. Also problematic  are the many  changes and  inconsistencies  in data 
collection procedures  and variable definitions during the seventeen  years in 
which  the PSID has been  conducted. Unfortunately,  this  also includes  the 
classification of  persons as institutionalized and the procedures  to trace such 
persons.  The creation  of  an internally  consistent  file requires a substantial 
amount  of  data  processing,  and  it  was  not  always possible  to  create  an 
unambiguous and consistent variable definition for all included time periods. 
Finally, though some information (e.g., age, sex, and income) is recorded by 
individual  household  member,  other information  about individuals  is either 
subsumed in  a household  total  or available only for head  and spouse. For 
example, race, number of  own children and siblings, and retirement data are 
recorded  only  for  heads  of  households  and  their  spouses.  Hence,  these 
variables can be assigned to individual sample members only if they have been 
head or spouse at least once during the sample period. This excludes some 
kinds of  analyses and creates a selectivity bias in other analyses. 
As a first step preceding the analysis, the PSID family-individual  file was 
therefore  converted into a rectangular  file of  elderly   individual^.^  Variable 
definitions common for all waves were employed, and time-invariant data that 
were collected only for heads and spouses were assigned to these individuals 
in periods in which they were neither head nor spouse. The “elderly”  were 
defined as individuals  who were aged 60  and above in  1968. This includes 
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a random  sample of  the population  aged 60  and above.4 An additional  178 
elderly are picked up after 1968, typically, when they join a family from the 
original PSID sampling frame. This part of the sample is nonrandom as its 
inclusion in the sample depends on the choice of living arrangement and will 
be employed only when conditioning on the origin of transition removes this 
choice bias. 
On the basis of  the household information collected in the PSID, the main 
dependent  variable  in  this  study-the  type  of  living  arrangement-can  be 
classified according to four categories: 
Independent living arrangements. The elderly’s household does not contain 
any other adult person beside the elderly individual and his or her spouse, 
if any (living arrangement type 11.~ 
Shared living arrangements. The elderly’s household contains at least one 
other adult person beside the elderly individual and his or her spouse. Two 
cases can be distinguished. (a)  The elderly is head of  household or spouse 
of  head  of  household  (living  arrangement  type  2).  In  this  case,  the 
relationship  between the elderly  and all other household  members  is well 
documented. (b)  The elderly is neither head of household nor spouse of head 
of  household  (living  arrangement type  3).  In  this  case,  the  relationship 
between the elderly and the other household members cannot be unambig- 
uously  determined. Most important, the data do not provide a distinction 
between an elderly person living in the household of  his or her son-in-law 
and an elderly person living in the household of  an unrelated person.6 
Institutional  living arrangements. This category includes elderly  who are 
living on a permanent basis in a health-care-related  facility (living arrange- 
ment type 4).  Examples are living in a home for the aged or in a nursing home 
but not temporary hospital or nursing home stays .’ 
This categorization  deserves some comments. First, it  would  have  been 
desirable to distinguish between adult childrenielderly  parent households and 
households  in  which  elderly  share accommodations with  other related  or 
unrelated persons. This is impossible because of the head-centered recording 
of  family  relationships.  Most but  not  all shared  accommodations represent 
adult children/elderly parent households. Based on the national file of the 1983 
AHS, 62.1 percent of all composite households  including an elderly person 
were childrenielderly parent(s) households (including in-laws). In 27.2 percent 
of these households, the elderly person shared accommodations with a related 
individual other than a child (mostly siblings); in the remaining  10.7 percent, 
at  least  one unrelated  person  lived  in  the composite household  (excluding 
in-laws) (see Borsch-Supan  1989). 
Second, it would have been desirable to distinguish between parents who 
live together with their adult children because the children have not yet left the 
household (this is a clear possibility for the younger aged who raised children 
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are legal owner of the family home and therefore head of household. This is 
impossible without a complete life history of all household members. On the 
other hand, I make a point of distinguishing headship from being a secondary 
individual in a composite household. 
Third, the concentration on permanent nursing home stays as a measure of 
institutionalization does not correspond to many published numbers that also 
include temporary nursing home stays. Most nursing home stays are quite brief 
(e.g., for convalescence)  and do not imply that the household was dissolved 
(e.g., by selling the house or moving out of  an apartment). These temporary 
nursing  home  stays  are treated  like hospital  stays, and  the person’s  living 
arrangement is the living arrangement before and presumably after the hospital 
stay. It is important to keep this in mind when interpreting the relatively small 
percentages of institutionalized persons in this paper.* 
3.2  A Markov Model of Living Arrangement Transitions 
First,  I  estimate transition  probabilities  for the entire random sample of 
elderly individuals. In addition to establishing some general tendencies, these 
transition  probabilities  will  serve as  a  yardstick  when  we  study  transition 
probabilities in special situations such as the years preceding death, the years 
after death of a spouse, or the years after onset of  a disability. 
Table 3.1 provides a survey of what happens in the sample: it presents the 
frequencies of living arrangement sequences among the 956 elderly whose life 
history  can be  traced  from  1968 on. Of  these  elderly,  602 died during the 
sample period, and 354 survived until 1984. The frequencies are reported once 
for the entire sample and once for the subsample of surviving elderly. 
The first result is the stability of living arrangements in spite of the long 
sample period  and the large proportion of elderly who die during  this time 
span. More than two-thirds of the elderly in both samples do not change their 
living arrangements at all. Most of the elderly live independently through the 
entire sample period or until their deaths. Of all elderly,  14.4 percent at least 
once shared a household not being head or spouse of head, and 3.1 percent 
have been in an institution for at least one entire year during the sample period. 
Apart from a higher proportion of multiple changes, there is astoundingly little 
difference between the two subgroups in the sample, the surviving elderly and 
those who died before  1984. 
This large proportion of  stayers creates a problem  in the specification of 
transition probabilities.  First, with only relatively few transitions,  the statis- 
tical base for the estimation of parametric transition probabilities is very small. 
I  choose not  to employ  relatively  sophisticated  hazard  models  based  on 
continuous time since they are more likely to generate imprecise results than 
simple Markovian models. The paper by Ellwood and Kane included in this 
volume provides an analysis of living arrangements parallel to this one using 
the  same data but  duration  models  based  on an exponential  hazard.  It  is 96  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Table 3.1  Frequencies of Living Arrangement Sequences, 1968-84 
(absolute and relative frequencies) 
Sequence Type 
All Elderly"  Surviving Elderlyb 
N  %  N  % 
No change during sample period 
1. Independent 
2. With others,  as head or  spouse 
3. With others, as secondary individual 
1 to 2 
1 to 3 
1 to 4 
2 to  I 
2 to 3 
2 to 4 
3 to 2 
3 to 4 
Between  1 and 2 only 
All others 
One change during sample period 
More than one change during sample period 
Total 















72.3  239 
55.0  198 
7.3  25 
9.9  16 
14.6  48 
3.6  15 
.4  0 
.6  0 
7.4  29 
.2  1 
.5  0 
1.2  2 
.8  1 
13.1  67 
















30  3.1  I  2.0 
956  100.0  354  100.0 
Source: PSID,  1968-84,  including nonrespondents. 
"All elderly aged 60 and above in 1968. 
bElderly aged 60 and above in  1968 who survived at least until 1984. 
interesting to note that all important qualitative  conclusions from these two 
papers coincide in spite of the different methodologies. 
Second, the large proportion of  stayers  suggests that  a model  of  simple 
Markov transitions will not describe the data well. This is so because, even if 
one-period  transitions  are estimated  correctly,  a standard first-order Markov 
model  will  predict  too  many  transitions  within  two or more periods  (cf. 
Amemiya 1985). This effect may be attributed to either unobserved population 
heterogeneity (certain types of individuals self-select into certain categories of 
living arrangements) or duration dependence (the likelihood of leaving a living 
arrangement category decreases with the duration in this category). Because 
of the few transitions observed in table 3.1, we will not be able to distinguish 
statistically between these two possibilities.  As was mentioned in the preced- 
ing  section, the  data lack  some obviously important information  (such  as 
detailed  health  status).  Therefore,  the  heterogeneity  model  appears  most 
appropriate  in this situation. 
One  solution  to  the  heterogeneity  problem  that  is  well  suited  to  this 
application is the so-called mover-stayer model developed by Goodman (1961) 
and exposed in Amemiya (1  985), which accounts for population heterogeneity 
by dividing the sample into stayers that never change their living arrangement 
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given period. Transition probabilities Pi#)  from living arrangement category 
I  to j for a given individual, not identified as either a mover or a stayer, are 
then given by 
where S, denotes the proportion of stayers in category  i, M,,(t)  the transition 
probability  of  movers from category i to j,  and  d,,  =  1 if  i  = j and 0 
otherwise. I identify stayers as those elderly who do not change their living 
arrangement in the seventeen years between 1968 and 1984 or between  1968 
and their deaths. Note that, unlike in other applications of  the mover-stayer 
model, the long time horizon and the fact that death excludes further changes 
provide for a reliable estimate of the stayer probabilities (e.g., McCall 1971). 
I then estimate the matrix of mover transition probabilities M,, by the sample 
frequencies of  observed  transitions  by  movers,  the  maximum  likelihood 
estimate. Table 3.2  presents the transition probabilities M,,  for movers and the 
resulting  unconditional  transition  probabilities  P,,  according to the  mover- 
stayer heterogeneity  assumption  in the above equation.' 
The unconditional transition probabilities P,, will serve as baseline estimates 
with which transition probabilities in special situations will be compared. Note 
that the matrix of two period transitions has a larger diagonal than the square 
of the transition matrices'O-it  is this feature of  the mover-stayer model that 
helps describe the stability of the elderly's living arrangements. 
In order to characterize the stayer population, table 3.3 reports multinomial 
logit estimates that relate the three stayer probabilities, S,, 1, . . . ,  3, relative 
to the probability  of  being a mover  to a set of  demographic and economic 
variables. There are no elderly who stay in an institution throughout the entire 
sample period (S, = 0). Two sets of estimations are provided:  one for the 
Table 3.2  Transition Probabilities 
Type of  Living Arrangement at Destination: 
Type of  Living Arrangement at Origin  1  2  3  4 
~~  ~ 
Transition probabilities for movers, Mi,: 
1. Independent 
2. With others, as headispouse 
3. With others, as secondary individual 
4. Institution 
Unconditional transition probabilities, Pt,: 
I, Independent 
2. With others, as headispouse 














,041  I 
,807  1 
,0640 














.006  1 
,0503 
.8621 
Source: PSID, 1968-84, elderly aged 60 and more in  1968, including nonrespondents. 98  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Table 3.3  A Logit Model of Stayer Probabilities (parameter estimates, 
&statistics in parentheses) 
Log Odds of  Staying in  . . . Rather than Changing 
(2)  (3) 
(1)  With Others,  With Others, as 
Independent  as HeadiSpouse  Secondary lndividual 
Sample 














I .0  -  ,778 
(- .8) 
68.4  .011 
(.V 
2.7  -  .012 
(- .3) 
.I8  ,585 
(2.4) 
.I4  -  ,448 
(-1.1) 
4.6  .029 
(.7) 
.04  -  ,162 
( -  .4) 
.25  -  ,510 
(-1.5) 
.I6  -  1.49X 
( -  6.0) 
.54  ,349 
2.84  -  .026 
(1.7) 
(-1.5) 
.30  ,378 
(1.8) 












-  ,045 
(- .8) 













(1  -4) 
-  2.000 
(-1.1) 




-  .300 
( -  .6) 




-  ,435 
( -  .4) 
-  .348 











-  16.687 
(.O) 










-  13.255 
(.0) 
























-  1.652 
(.O) 
6.600 
-  ,944 


































-  12.486 
(.0) 
All  Surv 
Likelihood at convergence, L(p) 
Percentage correctly predicted 
Number of observations 
Rho'  =  I  - L(P)/L(O) 
-735.66  -  261.06 
,444  .468 
67.26  64.69 
956  354 
Source: PSID, 1968-84, elderly aged 60 and more in 1968 who never changed their living arrangement. 
including nonrespondents. 
"All elderly aged 60 and above in  1968. 
bElderly aged 60 and above in  1968 who survived at least until  1984. 99  Household Dissolution and Living Arrangement Transitions by the Elderly 
entire sample, combining stayers who died  during  the sample period  and 
stayers who survived at least until  1984; and one set of estimations for the 
surviving elderly only. 
Most variables employed in table 3.3 are self-explanatory. AGE68 is age in 
year  1968. SINGLE (MARRIED) is a  dummy  variable  denoting that  the 
elderly was single (married) during the entire sample period.  YPERM is the 
average  income  during  the  sample  period.  NONWHITE  includes  black, 
Hispanic, Asian, Pacific, and Native American elderly. KIDS (SIBS) denotes 
the number of own children (siblings)  if reported; NOKIDS  (NOSIBS) is a 
dummy variable denoting that the elderly has no children (siblings).  Finally, 
the dummy variables MDKIDS and MDSIBS indicate missing data on number 
of children (siblings). The variables KIDS and SIBS are reported only in years 
when the elderly person was head of household or spouse. ’’  Thus data on own 
children and siblings is unavailable whenever an elderly person was never head 
of household or spouse during the entire sample period.  This lack of precise 
data about potential family support in this case is a major drawback of the data. 
The dummy  variables  MDKIDS  and  MDSIBS  that  indicate  these  cases 
eliminate any bias in the KIDS and NOKIDS variables (SIBS and NOSIBS, 
respectively) for those elderly for whom this information  is available. 
The positive coefficients of the SINGLE (MARRIED) variable indicate that 
the probability of being “mover”  increases by experiencing a marital status 
change, which  in almost all  cases represents  death  of  a  spouse. This is of 
course not surprising, and I will analyze the living arrangement  adjustments 
after the death of  a spouse in the following  section.  Male elderly are much 
more likely to be movers than female elderly. Note that this effect is measured 
holding marital  status constant. As we will see, this effect will become even 
more pronounced when we study the cases in which a spouse deceased. Race 
has a very strong effect on the stayer probabilities.  Being nonwhite decreases 
the probability of staying independent or as secondary individual but increases 
the probability  of heading a composite household. There are no measurable 
income effects, nor does the elderly’s age in year 1968 affect the mover-stayer 
probabilities. l2 
Although the measurement of the “supply-side”  variables for shared living 
arrangements-the  number of  own children and siblings-is  marred  by the 
above-mentioned  incomplete information  on these  two  variables,  we  can 
ascertain that the probability of being a stayer in the category “Independent 
Living Arrangements” increases with being childless, just as the presence of 
children and siblings increases  the probability  of  being  a stayer in the two 
shared accommodation categories. These latter two effects are, however, very 
small. I conclude that  most  shared  living  arrangements are of  a transitory 
nature. The probability of staying as a secondary individual is most strongly 
affected  by  the  MDKIDS  and  MDSIBS  indicator  variables.  This  is  not 
surprising because by construction these variables work essentially as choice- 
specific constants for the choice of  living arrangement type 3. 100  Axel Borsch-Supan 
There is  little  significant  difference  between  the  two  subgroups  in  my 
sample. Owing to the smaller sample size, the results for the surviving elderly 
are less precise.  This is particularly  true for the third column (staying with 
others as secondary individual). 
We  now  turn to the transition probabilities of those elderly who changed 
their living arrangement at least once during the sample period. As is obvious 
from table 3.2, some of  these transition  probabilities are very low, and it is 
therefore impossible separately to relate all sixteen transition  probabilities in 
a meaningful  way  to  the  above set of  relevant  demographic  and  economic 
variables. Table 3.4 provides some results for the transitions between living 
arrangement types  1 and 2 and, most  interestingly for our topic household 
dissolution,  the  transitions  into  types  3  (living  with  others  as  secondary 
individual,  in most cases being  “taken  in”  by adult children) and 4 (insti- 
tutionalization). The upper panel describes the binary choice between staying 
in either a type 1 or a type 2 living arrangement and a transition  to type 2 or 
1, respectively, conditional on having been identified  as a mover at least at 
some point in time, not necessarily this time. Possible transitions to the other 
two categories 3 and 4 are ignored, making use of the logit functional form and 
the independence of irrelevant alternatives. The lower panel pools all origins 
in order to gain degrees of freedom in estimating the transition  probabilities 
into the latter two living arrangement types. 
Most of the variables have already been introduced in table 3.2. In addition, 
I  now  measure  some  demographic  and  economic  changes  that  occurred 
concurrently with the transition.  DINCOME denotes the magnitude of a real 
income change; DMARR denotes a change in marital status (1 = becoming 
married; 0 = no change; -  1 = loss of a spouse, divorce, or separation); and 
DLIM indicates a change in limitation status (1 = health  status worse than 
previous year, 0 = no change, -  1 = health status better than previous year). 
I first comment on the left part of the upper panel in table 3.4, which re- 
flects the choice between a transition from living independently to sharing a 
household as head or spouse of head and staying independent.  The loss of a 
spouse (DMARR),13 a change in the severity of a disability (DLIM), and a loss 
in income (DINCOME) are the most important determinants that precipitate 
this transition. All other things equal, elderly women tend to stay independent, 
whereas elderly men tend to share accommodations. These results correspond 
to the same effects in the stayer population. Not being married in the first place 
strongly  increases  the  likelihood  of  a  transition,  as does  the  presence  of 
children  and  of  siblings  (though  statistically  not  significant)  and  being 
nonwhite.  Neither  age nor  calendar  time  significantly  alters  the  transition 
probabilities between living arrangement types 1 and 2, nor does the level of 
income. 
Not surprisingly, the reverse transition-breaking  up a composite household 
to become independent (right part of upper panel in table 3.4)-is  essentially 
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Table 3.4  Logit Models of Mover Transition Probabilities (parameter 
estimates, t-statistics in parentheses) 
Log Odds of  Moving . . . Rather than Staying 
From (1) Independent to  From (2) Shared as Head 
Variable  (2) Shared as Head  to (1) Independent 
CONST  -  2.614  (-1.67)  ,889  (.58) 
KIDS  ,061  (1.70)  ,005  (.I61 
SIBS  ,030  (.96)  -  ,041  (- 1.45) 
NONWHITE  ,348  (1.63)  ,348  (1.79) 
AGE68  ,015  (.96)  -  ,006  (- .39) 
FEMALE  -  ,354  (- 1.83)  -  .165  ( -  .90) 
INCOME  -  .021  (- .65)  ,011  (.43) 
DINCOME  -  ,001  ( -  5.83)  .045  (1.16) 
MARR  -  .739  ( -  3.50)  ,295  (1.52) 
DMARR  -  1.529  (-4.34)  1.319  (3.23) 
DLIM  ,280  (1.62)  -  ,249  (- 1.35) 
YEAR  -  ,013  (- .55)  -  ,006  (- .25) 
UP)  -544.6846  -501,9912 
Rho’  ,5780  ,2969 
% correct  90.92  79.71 
NOBS  1,862  1,030 
Log Odds of Moving to . . . Rather Than 
Staying or Moving Elsewhere 
To  (3) Sharing as 
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Source: PSID, 1968-84,  elderly aged 60 and more in 1968 who at least once changed their living 
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to be statistical artifacts, such as marriage with a person who was already living 
in the household as an unrelatcd secondary individual. This may be indicated 
by  the  strong coefficient of  DMARR. Note  that  nonwhite  as  well  as male 
elderly are more likely to change living arrangements, as was the case in the 
reverse transition. 
The lower panel indicates the probabilities of being takcn in by others and 
becoming institutionalized. As is evident, both probabilities increase with age, 
in  particular,  the risk  of  institutionalization.  Being  or becoming  single and 
being  male  also increase  these  probabilities.  The presence  of  children  or 
siblings decreases the risk of institutionalization and increases the likelihood 
of  being taken  in, as is expected. Again, the measurement  of  this  “family 
support-supply  effect’  ’ suffers  from the  large  number of  observations for 
which  a  precise  number of  children  or siblings cannot be  ascertained (as 
indicated  by  the variables  MDKIDS and  MDSIBS).  Most  transitions  into 
institutionalization or subfamily status are from living arrangement types 2-4, 
as indicated by the strong negative coefficient on the variable ORIGIN1 that 
denotes  transitions  from  living  independently,  once  again  reflecting  the 
stability particularly of the independent living arrangement category. Finally, 
and this is worth emphasizing, we observe a strong negative income effect on 
the  likelihood  of  entering an  institution.  Institutions  are clearly  viewed  as 
inferior living arrangements. 
As opposed to the probabilities in the upper panel, the transition probabil- 
ities into institutions and being taken in are nonstationary. This is indicated by 
the  effect  on  the  variable  YEAR,  which  measures  calendar  time.  The 
probability of  institutionalization,  controlling for all other factors included in 
the lower panel, exhibits an increasing trend, although measured imprecisely. 
The likelihood of being taken in, however, decreases between  1968 and 1984, 
with a large and statistically highly  significant coefficient.  This result has a 
strong and important implication: there appears to be a decreasing inclination 
of  the  family  or friends  to  take  care of  “their”  elderly  and  an  increasing 
reliance on institutions such as nursing homes  with their related private and 
social costs. The parameter estimate of  the risk of institutionalization  is not 
measured  statistically  precisely  because  it  is based on relatively  few transi- 
tions.  If  one takes  this  estimate as  best  available  guess  anyway,  then  it 
translates to a yearly increase of about 7 percent, that is, a doubling of the risk 
of institutionalization  within  ten years. l4 
3.3  Living Arrangement Changes after Death of a Spouse 
The analysis in the preceding section suggested that death of a spouse is the 
most important life event precipitating a change in living arrangements. The 
logit  regressions  in  table  3.4 related  living  arrangement  adjustments  to  a 
concurrent change in marital status. This section will take a closer look at the 
dynamics of what happens after the death of a spouse by studying changes not 
only in the concurrent year but also in consecutive years. 103  Household Dissolution and Living Arrangement Transitions by the Elderly 
In  my  sample,  317 elderly experienced the death of  their spouses  and 
survived  at least  one further year.  Table 3.5 presents  the frequencies with 
which living arrangement transitions occur in the year of  the spouses’ death 
and in the following years. 
Clearly, the transition probabilities in the year of  the spouse’s death (panel 
B) are quite different from what they are in the general population (panel A, 
from table 3.2).  Starting from living independently, the transition probability 
of joining another household as head of household becomes twice as large. The 
transition probabilities to subfamily status and into an institution increase even 
more  than  tenfold  (first  row  in  panel  B).  If  the  elderly  couple headed  a 
composite household, the death of the spouse also resulted in a much elevated 
likelihood  that  this common household is broken  up, leaving the surviving 
Table 3.5  Transition Probabilities after Death of a Spouse 
Typc of  Living Arrangement at Destination 
Type of  Living Arrangement at Origin  1  2  3  4 
A. Unconditional transition probabilities (from table 3.2): 
1. Independent  .9544  ,041  1 
2. With others, as headispouse  .1850  ,8071 
3. With others, as secondary individual  ,0685  ,0640 
4. Institution  ,0345  .  0000 
1, Independent  .8565  ,0826 
2. With others, as headispouse  .3556  ,6000 
3. With others, as secondary individual  ,0244  ,1220 
4. Institution  .oooo  .  0000 
xz  statistic B - A:  1,005.6 
1. Independent  ,9362  ,0638 
B. Year concurrent with death of spouse (317 observations): 
C. One year later (301 observations): 
2. With others, as headispouse  ,204  1  ,7959 
3. With others, as secondary individual  .OOOO  .  0000 
4. Institution  .oooo  .  0000 
xz statistic C - A: 47.8 
1. Independent  ,9656  ,0287 
2. With others, as headispouse  ,1429  ,8771 
3. With others, as secondary individual  .OOOO  .  0000 
4. Institution  .oooo  .  0000 
x2  statistic D - A: 57. I 
1. Independent  ,9542  ,0458 
2. With others, as headispouse  ,1860  ,8140 
3. With others, as secondary individual  .0000  .OOOO 
4. Institution  ,0000  .oooo 
xz statistic E - A: 40.6 
D. Two years later (267 observations): 
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Source; PSID, 1968-84,  317 elderly aged 60 and more in  1968 who lost their spouse, including 
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spouse either alone in the family home or as a new independent household 
(second row in panel B). Note that the probability of becoming institutional- 
ized is very high in the year in which the spouse deceases.  In a formal test, 
the equality of  panels A and B is strongly rejected.I5 
A comparison  of  the  panels  in  table  3.5 clearly  shows that  most  living 
arrangement adjustments  in response to death of  a spouse have taken place 
already  in  the  concurrent  year.  Though  panels  C-E  are  still  statistically 
different from panel A, the size of the chi-squared test statistic is much lower 
as compared to the test between panels A and B. One year after the spouse’s 
death, the probabilities of a transition between shared and independent living 
are still elevated, but this is reversed in the second year. 
Table 3.6 presents some logit estimation results for the first year transitions. 
They confirm the general tendencies detected in table 3.4 for all movers also 
for this special case of  transitions most likely precipitated by the death of  a 
spouse.  Unfortunately,  the  small  sample  size  prevents  a  more  detailed 
analysis, for instance, a stratification by living arrangement prior to death of 
spouse. 
The presence of children or siblings increases the probability of being taken 
in after the spouse’s death. Old age, low income to begin with, or an income 
loss increase the likelihood of  a transition  into an institution. Female elderly 
are more likely to stay living in the family home than widowers.  If  a health 
limitation develops  concurrently  with  the  death  of  a  spouse, the  surviving 
elderly is most likely taken in by the family or by  friends rather than being 
institutionalized.  Nonwhite elderly are less likely to stay independently than 
white elderly. 
Living  arrangement  prior  to the  spouse’s  death  is accounted  for by  the 
variable ORIGIN1 (if independent) and, though indirectly, by the missing data 
indicators.  Note that, because  MDKIDS  and  MDSIBS  essentially  serve as 
indicator variables for categories 2 and  3, introduction of variables such as 
ORIGIN2  and  ORIGIN3  would  result  in  almost  perfect  collinearity  with 
MDKIDS and MDSIBS. The negative sign of ORIGIN1 (the reference case) 
and  the  positive  signs of  the  statistically significant  missing  data  variables 
indicate the smaller likelihood of a change as compared to staying in living 
arrangements  1, 2, and 3. 
Stationarity of  these transition  probabilities is clearly rejected: the results 
confirm the existence and the direction of the time trends already discovered 
in  table  3.4. All other determinants  being  equal, institutionalization  is be- 
coming more likely and being taken in by family or friends less likely as time 
proceeds from  1968 to 1984. 
3.4  Living Arrangement Changes after Onset of a Disability 
The logit estimates for all elderly movers in  table 3.4 also confirmed  the 
commonsense notion that disability status is an important factor determining 
an elderly’s living arrangement.  This section makes  an  attempt to identify 105  Household Dissolution and Living Arrangement Transitions by the Elderly 
Table 3.6  Logit Transition Probabilities: After Death of Spouse (parameter 
estimates, t-statistics in  parentheses) 
Log Odds of  Transition to  . . . Rather Than to (I) Independent 
(3) With Others, 
(2) With Others,  as Secondary 
Variable  as HeadlSpouse  Individual  (4) Institution 
CONST  14.555 
AGE68  -  ,022 
(- .7) 
KIDS  ,085 
(1.1) 
NOKIDS  -  ,369 
(- 3) 
MDKIDS  ,653 
(.5) 
SIBS  -  .079 
(-.8? 
NOSIBS  -.165 
(-.a 
MDSIBS  -  ,951 
(F.8) 
NONWHITE  1.283 
(2.7) 
FEMALE  -  ,560 
(- 1.2) 
INCOME  -.156 
(-1.1) 
DINCOME  ,016 
(. 1) 
DLIM  ,630 
(1.1) 
ORIGIN  1  -  2.856 
(-6.3) 
YEAR  -.165 
(-3.1) 
(3.1) 
Likelihood at convergence, L(p) 
Percentage correctly predicted 
Number of observations 
RhoZ =  1 -  L(p)/L(O) 
-  3.676 
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Source: PSID, 1968-84,  317 elderly aged 60 and more in 1968 who lost their spouse, including 
nonrespondents. 
cases in which  a disability  occurs suddenly in order to investigate  the time 
pattern of  living arrangement  adjustments precipitated  by this event. 
In fact, changes in disability status are quite hard to measure, in general and 
particularly  in the PSID. The question in the survey (“Are  you limited by a 
health condition?”) provides four answers (“A lot,” “Somewhat,”  “A  little,” 106  Axel Borsch-Supan 
and “No”) that depend on the subjective self-rating of the elderly person. Prior 
to  1976, only two categories were provided  (“Yes”  and  “No”).“  Not  too 
surprisingly, limitation histories are characterized by a lot of ups and downs 
that may reflect partly actual subjective feelings and partly arbitrariness in the 
choice of  categories. In addition, many elderly experience a gradual decline 
in health status with no clear onset of a disability that could be classified as 
“one event.” 
I define the onset of a disability quite conservatively as a permanent changc 
in disability status: in order to qualify, disability status must be “No”  for at 
least five years, then “Yes,”  “Somewhat.”  or “A lot” for at least another five 
years. With this definition, I count 237 elderly in the sample who experience 
a well-defined and sudden change in health status. Table 3.7 presents the actual 
number of transitions that occur in the year of the health change and in the three 
years thereafter. Elderly persons who are in a nursing home are excluded in this 
sample because their limitation status is not recorded. 
Unfortunately, the main conclusion to be drawn from these transitions is that 
the  number  of  actual  changes  is  too  small  from  which  to  draw  reliable 
conclusions. A formal test of whether the corresponding conditional transition 
probabilities  are equal to those predicted  in the lower panel  of  table 3.2 is 
significant in the period concurrent with the disability change, barely  signif- 
icant one year later, and insignificant two and three years later. l7  If a reliable 
Table 3.7  Transitions after Onset of a Disability 
Typc of  Living Arrangement 
at Destination 
Type of Living Arrangement at Origin  1  2  3 
A. Year concurrent with onset of disability: 
I. Independent 
2. With others, as headispouse 
3. With others, as secondary individual 
B. One year later: 
I. Independent 
2. With others, as headispouse 
3. With others, as secondary individual 
C. Two years later: 
1. Independent 
2. With others, as headispouse 
3. With others, as secondary individual 
D. Three years later: 
1. Independent 
2. With others, as head/spouse 






































Source  PSID, 1968-84, 237 elderly aged 60 and more in 1968 who expenenced a well-defined 
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result can be extracted from table 3.7, then it is a larger probability to stay in 
living arrangements  type 2  and 3 (i.e., living together  with  children,  other 
relatives, or unrelated  persons) in response to a sudden health change to the 
worse. Unfortunately, the lack of disability data for institutionalized persons 
made it impossible to detect transitions into nursing homes after the death of 
a spouse. 
It should be noted that these weak results are only apparently in contrast to 
the  strong  significance  of  the  variable  DLIM  (change  in  the  severity  of 
limitation relative to the previous period) in the previous logit analyses. This 
section  limits  itself  to  the  obviously  rare  cases  of  sudden  well-defined 
unidirectional health changes, whereas the variable DLIM picks up many small 
changes. In fact, the idea of a sudden onset of a disability rather than a gradual 
change that eventually  necessitates  living arrangement  adjustments  may  be 
inappropriate, or, if such a thing as a sudden onset exists, the measurement of 
it by a subjective self-rating rather than a functional index of ability may be 
misleading.  Some  evidence  for  the  latter  explanation  can  be  found  in 
Borsch-Supan,  Kotlikoff,  and Moms (1988).  They  show that,  among  the 
health variables available in their data set, functional ability is the one that best 
explains living arrangement changes, rather than subjective health indexes or 
indicators of actual medical conditions. 
3.5  Living Arrangement Changes in the Years Preceding Death 
This last section investigates where the elderly spend the last five years of 
their lives. 1 count time backward (measuring something like “negative age”) 
and construct a panel that starts with the year of each elderly’s death for those 
602 elderly for whom date of death is observed. Of those, 448 elderly have at 
least  five  years  of  complete  data.  Table  3.8 presents  the  cross-sectional 
distribution  of  living arrangement types by year before death, and table 3.9 
displays the frequency of  all living arrangement  sequences observed in this 
sample. 
The main message from these two tables is, once again, the stability of living 
arrangements-even  in the years immediately preceding death. Almost four 
out of  five elderly  (79.7 percent)  do not  change  their  living  arrangements 
during  this  time. Note  that  this  fraction  is even larger  than  in  the  elderly 
population as a whole. Though one might expect a decreasing mobility with 
very old age in general,I8 there is also an increase in the necessity to adjust 
living  arrangements  in  this  segment  of  life,  for  instance,  induced  by  an 
increasing frailty in the years preceding death. Obviously, at least in this PSID 
sample, the first mechanism is stronger than the second. 
More than half (55.4 percent) the elderly have been living independently 
until their deaths. Every fifth of all elderly (20.1 percent) has been taken in by 
his or her children, relatives, or friends at least once through the last five years 
before death, most of them (15.2 percent) at least for these five years. Finally, 108  Axel Borsch-Supan 
Sequence  Frequency 
Table 3.8  Living Arrangements by  Year  before Death (percentages) 
Sequence  Frequency 
(2)  (3) 
(1)  With Others,  With Others, as  (4) 
Year  Independent  as HeadiSpouse  Secondary Individual  Institutionalized 
5  64.1  16.7 
4  64.7  15.8 
3  65.2  15.8 
2  64.7  15.8 
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Source: PSID,  1968-84,  elderly aged 60 and more in 1968 who died before  1984 
Note: Sequence 11  112 denotes the choice of  living arrangement type 2 in the year of  death and 
of  type  1 in the preceding four years. The four living arrangement types are denoted as follows: 
1 = independent; 2 = with others, as headispouse; 3 = with others, as secondary individual; 
4 = institutionalized. 
about 6 percent of the elderly became institutionalized during this time period, 
almost all of  whom stay so until their deaths. 
The few changes observed in the sample would put any dynamic analysis 
on a very  weak  footing. Hence, I recur to cross-sectional  analysis  in  this 
section. Table 3.10 provides  a cross-sectional  analysis of  where the elderly 
choose to live within their last five years of life. The sample consists of  all 
observations with complete data.  l9 109  Household Dissolution and Living Arrangement Transitions by the Elderly 
Table 3.10  Cross-sectional Choice Probabilities: Five Years before Death 
(logit parameter estimates, t-statistics in parentheses) 
Log Odds of  Living in  . . . Rather Than in (1) Independent 
(2)  With Others,  (3) With Others, as 
Variable  as HeadiSpouse  Secondary Individual  (4) Institution 
CONST  6.640 
AGE68  -  ,018 
(-1.5) 
KIDS  ,139 
(5.5) 
NOKIDS  -2.447 
(- 6.7) 
AGEKID  -  ,047 
(- 6.2) 
SIBS  -  ,085 
(- 2.5) 
NOSIBS  .298 
(1.1) 
NONWHITE  1.359 
(7.8) 
FEMALE  -  ,471 
(-2.5) 
INCOME  -  ,018 
(-1.2) 
MARRIED  -  1.029 
(-5.8) 
LIMITED  -  ,014 
(-.a 
HBURDEN  ,012 




Likelihood at convergence, L(p) 
Percentage correctly predicted 
Number of  observations 
RhoZ =  1 - L(p)/L(O) 
12.038 
(2.4) 




-  1.777 
(-1.4) 
-  ,042 
(-1.6) 






-  1.676 
(-3.7) 
-  ,024 
(-.5) 
-4.493 
( -  6.6) 
-  ,497 
(- 2.3) 
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Source; PSID,  1968-84,  elderly aged 60 and more in 1968 who died before  1984 
The analysis in table 3.10 confirms what we have learned so far and shows 
that some of these effects are particularly pronounced for the very old and most 
vulnerable elderly. Female elderly are more likely to live independently than 
male elderly. Black or Hispanic elderly have a higher likelihood of living in 
shared accommodations, as do elderly with many children. Being married has 
the  expected  strong  positive  effect  on  living  independently.  Finally,  the 
variable YEAR that indicates calendar time (not time before death) once again 
displays  the  trend  toward  institutionalization  and  away  from  composite 
households. Note that in this sample of the very old the magnitude of this trend 110  Axel Borsch-Supan 
is particularly pronounced. This is a disturbing finding as it appears to indicate 
a trend toward isolation of those who are particularly vulnerable. 
A new variable included is denoted by AGEKID and measures the age of 
the oldest child. The strong negative coefficient of  this variable  in  the left- 
most column that characterizes  composite households  headed by  the elderly 
person appears to indicate the presence of  adult children who have never left 
home. As was mentioned already in section 3.  I,  it would have been desirable 
to separate these cases from other shared living arrangements. However, the 
lack of  complete life histories of  all household  members makes this impos- 
sible. 
Two economic variables are included. The elderly person’s income has a 
measurable  effect  only on the  probability  to become  institutionalized;  the 
negative sign shows the inferiority of this alternative-a  familiar result by now. 
The newly introduced variable HBURDEN is the proportion of income that the 
household must spend on housing; actual gross housing costs (either rent or 
user costs of homeownership plus utilities) are divided by household income. 
For  institutionalized  persons,  it  measures  the  last  housing  burden  before 
institutionalization.  For elderly heads, a large burden is a small but significant 
incentive to share housing. A large housing burden appears also to be a factor 
that increases the likelihood of entering  an institution. 
3.6  Summary and Conclusions 
I employed the newly available nonresponse  file of the PSID to study the 
living arrangements of elderly Americans. In spite of being a general purpose 
study that contains some eleven hundred elderly aged 60 and above, this file 
is on first sight particularly suited to studying the elderly’s living arrangements 
since it includes long histories of living arrangements and their demographic 
and economic determinants and since it keeps the elderly in the sample when 
they decease during the  sample period  or, most  important, become  institu- 
tionalized. No other representative data set combines such a long time horizon 
as the PSID with a complete recording  of  nonresponses  owing to death or 
institutionalization.  On the other hand, problems with the data-being  only 
partly individual oriented with an incomplete recording of family relationships 
once secondary individuals are living in a composite household, inconsisten- 
cies in the treatment of institutionalization,  and a sample size too small for the 
few  observed  transitions-substantially  inhibited  the  possible  kinds  of 
longitudinal analyses. A longitudinal study specifically for the elderly is still 
highly  desirable  for dynamic analyses  of  the  elderly’s  living  arrangement 
transitions. 
The main result of  the paper is the stability of living arrangements. Even 
after incisive life events such as death of a spouse or onset of a disability, and 
even within  the  last five years  before  death, often  associated  with  a quick 
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say,  in  order to move into the household  of  their  children  or to live in  an 
institution. 
This stability,  however,  puts  the  analyst  in  an awkward  position  as  the 
resulting small absolute number of changers in the PSID creates a problem for 
the dynamic analysis.  It is my opinion that there are just too few people to 
support a rich dynamic analysis. A good example for this point is the analysis 
in the preceding  chapter. A well-suited  statistical model would have been a 
fixed effects model that accounts for time-invariant but unobserved differences 
(“heterogeneity”)  among the elderly, such as frailty.*’ However, the condi- 
tioning  on fixed effects necessary  for consistent parameter estimation  also 
removes all other time-invariant determinants because these are collinear with 
the fixed effects. To put it simply, only time variation identifies the dynamics 
of a dynamic model. Little time variation in the remaining variables and few 
transitions  observed in the  sample render  the resulting  fixed  effects model 
completely unsatisfactory. 21 
I  therefore  employed very  simple models, hoping  that  simplicity  would 
ensure  robustness. Baseline  transition  probabilities  were  estimated  using  a 
mover-stayer  model  that  accounts  in  the  most  simple way  for unobserved 
heterogeneity,  and  the  transition  probabilities  in  the  three  special  cases 
investigated were parametrized as parsimoniously as possible. I think that this 
strategy is more appropriate than employing continuous-time hazard models. 
On  the  one  hand,  the  data  appear  to  be  too  weak  to  allow  for  proper 
identification of heterogeneity and state dependence, which could provide the 
rich  dynamics  that  hazard  models  are  able  to  generate.  Ignoring  state 
dependence  and  unobserved  heterogeneity,  however,  may  render  hazard 
models inappropriate when important variables such as health are unobserved. 
In spite of  all these problems, I arrived at quite a few results that appear to 
be robust and are important for the assessment of where the elderly chose to 
live and what implications this choice has for their well-being.  These results 
are robust as they can be drawn not only from the different models in this paper 
but also from Ellwood and Kane’s analysis (ch. 4, in this volume), which is 
based on a simple exponential hazard model. They are important as they indicate 
where, if at all, public policy could improve the well-being of the elderly: there 
appear to be  only  a  few  intervention  points-most  important,  death  of  a 
spouse-when  active decisions about living arrangements are being made: 
Loss  of  a  spouse  is  the  most  important  event  that  precipitates  living 
arrangement transitions.  Almost all these transitions take place in the same 
year as the spouse’s death. 
Living in an institution is clearly an inferior living arrangement in terms of 
income,  even  in  the  years  immediately  preceding  death,  when  medical 
attention is most valued. 
Male elderly are more likely to live with others or to become institutionalized 
than female elderly,  who most likely stay living  independently  until  their 112  Axel Borsch-Supan 
deaths. This is holding all other determinants, particularly  marital status, 
constant. 
There is  a  pronounced  difference in  the choice of  living  arrangements 
between white and nonwhite elderly. Nonwhite elderly are much more likely 
to live with others in a composite household. 
In spite of the perceived inferiority of  institutions, the risk of  institutional- 
ization has risen substantially from 1968 to 1984, while the likelihood of 
being “taken  in”  by relatives or friends has fallen dramatically. 
This disturbing  tendency toward isolation  of the elderly-particularly  pro- 
nounced among the very old, who are also the most vulnerable-is  the most 
important message of this paper. As pointed out in the introductory section, 
this growing isolation of the elderly has downstream consequences in terms of 
medical expenses and social support that are rather costly for society at large 
and that have to be borne by a decreasing proportion of  younger people-not 
to mention the psychological and physical problems for the elderly themselves 
caused by growing isolation. 
Notes 
1. For example, the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey (LRHS), the Survey of 
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), and the AHS for the noninstitutionalized 
population  and  the  National  Nursing  Home  Survey  (NNHS)  and  the  Survey  of 
Institutionalized Persons (SIP) for the institutionalized population. One exception is the 
longitudinal study by the Hebrew Rehabilitation Center for the Aged; for an analysis, 
cf. Borsch-Supan, Kotlikoff, and Morris (1988). 
2. The complete family-individual file has almost six-hundred megabytes. To make 
matters worse, owing to moving in and out, panel members sharing the same household 
are scattered throughout the file. 
3.  The  data-processing  programs  are  available  on  request  for  a  fee  covering 
duplication and handling charges. 
4. Excluded is a small percentage of  elderly individuals whose living arrangement 
history  could  not  be  ascertained  because  of  interview  refusal  or  failure  to  locate 
them. 
5. There are a few cases where an elderly household had children under 18. These 
are included in this category. 
6. With the exception of the years  1982-84. 
7. I perceive entering an  institution as an active choice that possibly depends on 
demographic and economic characteristics as well as health. This does not necessarily 
imply, however, that the elderly person has to make the choice alone. 
8. For an analysis of lengths of nursing home stays, see Garber and MaCurdy (ch. 
6, in this volume). 
9. Unconditional in the  sense that  they  describe  the  transition  probability  of  an 
individual not identified as either a mover or a stayer. 
10. For a proof, cf. Amemiya (1985, p. 419). 
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12. From a retrospective point of view when date of death is known, remaining years 
to death (“negative age”) may be a more interesting variable than AGE68. If this were 
so, there  should  be  a  significant  difference  between  the  coefficients  in  the  two 
subgroups, which is not the case. 
13. This is a loose spoken characterization. Almost all cases of DMARR  = -  1 are 
deaths of spouses, but there are also a few divorces in old age. 
14. The parameter estimate of  the risk of  being taken in implies a yearly decrease 
of over 26 percent at sample average. This percentage change-this  is a relative change, 
not a change in absolute percentage points-is  too large to be meaningfully extrapolated 
for ten years because in the highly nonlinear logit model the effect of a change depends 
on the magnitudes of the choice probabilities. 
15. The  test  is  constructed  as  a joint  test  of  the  sixteen  conditional  transition 
probabilities. Because only the rows, not the columns, in each table are adding up, the 
chi-squared statistics have twelve degrees of  freedom. At 99 percent confidence, the 
critical value is 26.22. 
16. To make matters worse, in some years, limitation status was asked only for head 
and spouse, resulting in missing data for those elderly who changed disability status 
while not being head or spouse of household. 
17. At 99 percent confidence. 
18. The  results  in  tables  3.3 and  3.4 neither  prove  nor  reject  this  hypothesis. 
Feinstein and McFadden (1989) report increasing mobility rates for elderly aged 75 
and above on the basis of PSID data, but  they do not investigate the very old. Venti 
and Wise (1989) cannot find systematic age differences in the narrow age distribution 
of  the RHS. 
19. There are two econometric problems with these estimates: selectivity bias and 
panel bias. Both appear innocent in this case. The way in which data on children and 
siblings is imputed implies that elderly who live as secondary individuals in a composite 
household and institutionalized elderly have a larger than proportional share of missing 
data.  However,  the resulting  sample  selectivity  is  innocent  owing  to inclusion  of 
constants and the logit functional form (McFadden 1978). The pooling of cross sections 
in this nonlinear model may also result in biased coefficients. The bias appears to be 
of no quantitative importance in this case as coefficients estimated from single cross 
sections are of  similar magnitude and equal signs. 
20.  For  the  development  of  this  model,  cf.  Chamberlain  (1980).  For  some 
applications, see Borsch-Supan (1987). 
21.  See also the difficulties experienced  by  Schwartz,  Danziger,  and Smolensky 
(1984) and the large standard errors in Ellwood and Kane (ch. 4, in this volume). 
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Comment  Herman B. Leonard 
Those who think they know that elderly Americans want to (and, for the most 
part, do) live by themselves, accepting a move to live with their children only 
reluctantly  and  a  move  to  an  institution  only  in  desperation,  owe  Axel 
Borsch-Supan a great debt. They are right, and they can now proceed to know 
what they  know with greater assurance  than they formerly  had  any right to 
feel. 
Borsch-Supan’s paper provides a readable and comprehensive description of 
what we can learn about transitions among various living arrangements for the 
elderly  from  the  new  nonresponse  files  of  the  PSID.  The  inclusion  of 
(unfortunately  incomplete) data about those who did not survive the sample 
period permits far more detailed examination of the final and crucial transitions 
in living arrangements by aging families and individuals. 
Borsch-Supan is careful not to extract more than is there from his data. In 
particular,  he emphasizes a number of  gaps  in the  data frame that  prevent 
developing large enough sample sizes to permit confident estimation and in- 
ference for at least some of the important issues these data permit approach- 
ing. For some questions-for  example, which elderly families are living with 
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children who are still dependent on them, and which  are dependent on the 
children  with  whom they  are living-these  data provide only tantalizingly 
indistinct hints. Throughout the paper, we get glimpses of what we will be able 
to learn with more complete data and clear indications of how valuable it would 
be to have data constructed  with these important research issues in mind. 
Nonetheless, to dwell on the gaps in these data is to emphasize entirely the 
wrong  feature  of  this  paper.  As interested  researchers, we perhaps  always 
tend to have our attention drawn to the paper that might have been, to the data 
that might yet be. But if we indulge that instinct here we will miss what is 
most important about this paper: that these data are better than those we have 
previously  had,  that  they  allow  us  to  get  at  questions  of  profound 
consequence with  regard  to  public  policies  about  aging,  that  the  results 
developed from or pointed to by these data are almost certain to be confirmed 
by  any subsequent analysis from whatever better data we may eventually be 
able to get, and-most  important-that  we do not have the luxury of  waiting 
because these questions are of deep moment now. What better data will show 
is what Borsch-Supan is able at least to sketch here. Given the importance of 
his findings, they deserve to have their implications explored now as guides 
to the actions we will surely be taking in the meantime, while better data are 
sought, 
The Backdrop:  Society’s Preferences 
Borsch-Supan  is able to show us enough to tell a very important story. To 
understand  its importance and implications, it has to be viewed  against the 
backdrop of  what society and the elderly want for the last years of life. To  be 
sure, these tastes are value laden and culture bound. It may seem odd to think 
about what society’s preferences about individuals’ preferences might be-as 
a profession, economists usually  take individual  preferences  as given  and 
inquire about how well alternative decisions or social decision mechanisms 
serve them. But, if given a choice about what people’s preferences might be, 
society  as a  whole would  surely prefer  that  individuals  aspire to forms of 
consumption  that are relatively  low in resource intensity  and would  surely 
like  to avoid  having  individuals  prefer  heavily  resource-intensive  forms of 
consumption  that  produce  a relatively  low  quality of  life.  Hence,  society 
might  well  have  a  strong  preference  for  individuals  to  prefer  avoiding 
institutionalization in the last years of life. If most individuals strongly prefer 
either  independent  living or living in the company of  others-and,  impor- 
tantly, if those with whom they may live also prefer shared arrangements- 
then it is both widely believed and plausible that a reasonable quality of life 
for the elderly or the disabled can be provided at considerably lower real cost 
than  if,  by  contrast,  all  or  some  of  the  relevant  parties  strongly  prefer 
institutionalization (either for themselves or for those who might otherwise live 
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It  seems reasonable to suppose that  society  has a  strong  preference  for 
independent  and  shared  living  arrangements instead  of  institutionalization. 
Institutions are not merely expensive; they are also almost inherently capable 
of  providing only a relatively low quality of  life, almost irrespective of their 
cost. To minimize the social  cost of such inefficient arrangements, society might 
then actively seek to support a social culture of independence  and shared living. 
Results 
Against the backdrop of that conception of social interest, what news does 
Borsch-Supan provide? The good news is that the news is generally good. The 
bad news is that it is deteriorating. 
First, Borsch-Supan finds high levels of  independent living. It appears that 
people very strongly seek to avoid institutionalization,  and this suggests that 
they may be responsive to programs that seek to provide options through which 
they can remain independent. 
Second, Borsch-Supan finds  that  the  rates  of  independent  living  and  of 
shared living have been falling, and the risk of institutionalization rising, over 
the last twenty years. This is no great surprise to those who have looked at the 
increase in the institutionalized population, but it is particularly strikingly laid 
out in Borsch-Supan’s  careful analysis. Holding other factors constant, the 
hazard of  institutionalization  has markedly  increased. This implies  that  the 
rapid growth of  the institutionalized population is due not merely to the rapid 
growth in the population of very old people but also to a conditional growth 
in the fraction of those institutionalized,  holding fixed age and other factors. 
We  should  be  very  interested, as a  society,  in  finding  ways  to check this 
increase. The size of the at-risk population will continue to rise rapidly; if the 
rate at which that group enters institutions also continues to grow, the prospects 
both for the elderly and for society are quite unattractive. 
Borsch-Supan also develops the very important result that living patterns are 
very stable. The mixed movers/stayers model reveals that a large component 
of  the  relevant  population  has  substantial  inertia.  This  is  an  extremely 
important (though not terribly surprising) result because it suggests that if we 
help people toward preferred outcomes-independent  living or shared living 
in composite households-the  results may be durable. 
It  would  be very  valuable  from a  policy  perspective  to  have  additional 
evidence on this point.  What Borsch-Supan observes is that, under current 
incentives, there is substantial inertia in changing patterns of living. This is 
hopeful, but  it  does not  immediately  indicate  that  social  interventions  to 
influence the choice of living pattern will have long-term effects. If the choice 
is induced (e.g., by suasion or by a financial incentive), it may fit less well, 
wear less comfortably, and persist for a shorter time. Since this is an issue of 
substantial  consequence for policy-making  regarding  the  elderly  and  dis- 
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Borsch-Supan  also finds, again not surprisingly, that a major risk point of 
transition is the death of a spouse. This is well known; Borsch-Supan’s results 
simply  demonstrate  how  disruptive  this  transition  is.  Again,  this  is  an 
important result from a policy perspective. Through Borsch-Supan’s lens, we 
come  to  see  living  patterns  as  stable and  durable  over  long  periods  but 
punctuated by relatively short periods of tumultuous transition. The effects of 
the transition triggers damp out relatively rapidly across time-for  example, 
those who continue to live independently  for two years past the death of  a 
spouse begin to have transition probabilities that resemble those who have had 
no transition  in marital status. Having survived  a period of high hazard  for 
living pattern change (triggered by death of the spouse), the survivor emerges 
into a possibly long and stable period of independent life. In Borsch-Supan’s 
data,  traumas  either  have  effects  on  living  patterns  that  are  relatively 
immediate or have none at all. 
This suggests that a policy of  active social intervention targeted at high-risk 
points might be effective and valuable.  If  the newly widowed can be helped 
in forming a new independent household, they may be able to maintain their 
independent status indefinitely. If, by contrast, their transition in marital status 
induces  a change in  living arrangement, that  effect  is  likely  to be  largely 
irreversible. Once again, we cannot tell from Borsch-Supan’s results whether 
a  programmatic  intervention  targeted  at  such  high-risk  points  would  be 
effective-but  they do suggest that, if we could find an effective short-term 
intervention,  it might repay dividends over a long period. 
Finally, Borsch-Supan demonstrates that cultural and social factors seem to 
be important in determining the rates at which people choose particular living 
arrangements. Race and sex have strong effects on the propensity to choose 
particular arrangements and to make transitions among them. While this is not 
surprising  and  is  well  known,  we  do not  have  a  clear  idea  of  what  the 
underlying  cause is. Are we seeing people’s expectations about themselves 
reflected in their choices? Are social or cultural factors central determinants? 
Are demographic forces dominant (e.g., healthy unmarried men are substan- 
tially  outnumbered  by  women  among the  elderly  and  so  may  have  more 
opportunities to develop shared living arrangements)? 
While we  do not  know  the  causes,  the  fact  that  the  rates  differ  across 
population  subgroups suggests that  different  influences are operating-and, 
thus, perhaps  that these influences could be changed. Our society has done 
relatively little to shape people’s expectations about how they should live in 
their later years or to shape their preferences.  It has done even less to shape 
the sense of obligation felt by children, siblings, or others who might be able 
to provide either support of  continued independent  living or a shared living 
arrangement. It is not clear that any effective intervention on these dimensions 
could be crafted-but,  if society cares enough about influencing the pattern of 
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differ across population subgroups gives us a place to start in assessing what 
seems to influence people’s preferences  and senses of obligation. 
Conclusion 
Institutionalization holds very unattractive prospects for the elderly and for 
society. It threatens to consume a high fraction of the life savings of those at 
risk and of their offspring and to provide them with a low quality of life in spite 
of its high cost. If  it becomes common-if  many of  us find that our friend’s 
parents are living in institutions-it  may erode whatever sense of  obligation 
or  preference  it  is  that  currently  leads  many  to  provide  a  shared  living 
arrangement for older or disabled siblings, parents, or friends. Even compar- 
atively, institutionalized living provides, in the view of many, what is on the 
whole a poor way to die. 
Society has limited possibilities for intervening in these outcomes. From a 
public policy perspective, Borsch-Supan’s results raise major questions about 
what role society can and should take. First, it might choose to try to reduce 
reliance on institutional living arrangements. If so, it will have to do somewhat 
more than just say no to  institutionalization.  It will  have to  seek to build a 
culture of self and mutual reliance.  If  it is successful in doing so and more of 
the frail and sick remain at home, society will also confront additional ethical 
challenges. For example, can we adapt to letting people die at home of illnesses 
or conditions from which they might be saved in a hospital,  in order to avoid 
their being institutionalized thereafter,  if they would prefer it? 
In addition, Borsch-Supan’s  work  frames important questions about  the 
advisability  of  programs  to  support independent  and shared  living arrange- 
ments  for those  at risk  of  institutionalization.  The judicious use  of  public 
support to enhance the possibility of continuing in independent or shared living 
status might have durable effects and might provide manyfold returns in both 
private and public savings from institutionalization.  But it could also feed what 
may become an insatiable appetite for expensive assistance for those capable 
of  remaining  independent  without  it.  Once such help  exists, much  of  the 
elderly population may come to see it as an entitlement, even if they are not 
truly at risk of  being unable to function independently  without it. Moreover, 
there is a substantial moral hazard. Many are now capable of living alone only 
because of support (running errands, helping with cooking, and so on) from 
their children, siblings, or friends. The provision of these private services is 
costly to the provider. If the public comes forward to provide or to pay for some 
of these services, some of these volunteer workers supporting the independent 
living arrangements of elderly or disabled people may disappear, graciously 
accepting  the  public’s unintended  offer to  substitute  public  help  for their 
current private  actions. Such programs  are potentially  extremely  costly and 
would not necessarily even expand the services available to those in need of 
them. Their desirability is, then, an open question, and we must await further 
research on  people’s reactions to these kinds of programs before we can tell 119  Household Dissolution and Living Arrangement Transitions by the Elderly 
whether  society’s  interests-and  the  elderly ’s-would  be  well  served  by 
introducing them. 
Questions like these go well beyond the scope of Borsch-Supan’s work, but 
he has taken us a very useful step toward framing the relevant questions more 
clearly and toward having a more definitive data base for knowing what many 
thought they already knew. We can now proceed with more confidence about 
what we know-and,  therefore, with less trepidation-into  the policy terrain, 
fraught though it may be with cultural and sociological as well as economic 
considerations. This Page Intentionally Left Blank